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Abstract
We consider the problem of private information retrieval through wiretap channel
II (PIR-WTC-II). In PIR-WTC-II, a user wants to retrieve a single message (file)
privately out ofM messages, which are stored in N replicated and non-communicating
databases. An external eavesdropper observes a fraction µn (of its choice) of the
traffic exchanged between the nth database and the user. In addition to the privacy
constraint, the databases should encode the returned answer strings such that the
eavesdropper learns absolutely nothing about the contents of the databases. We aim
at characterizing the capacity of the PIR-WTC-II under the combined privacy and
security constraints. We obtain a general upper bound for the problem in the form
of a max-min optimization problem, which extends the converse proof of the PIR
problem under asymmetric traffic constraints. We propose an achievability scheme that
satisfies the security constraint by encoding a secret key, which is generated securely
at each database, into an artificial noise vector using an MDS code. The user and the
databases operate at one of the corner points of the achievable scheme for the PIR
under asymmetric traffic constraints such that the retrieval rate is maximized under
the imposed security constraint. The upper bound and the lower bound match for the
case of M = 2 and M = 3 messages, for any N , and any µ = (µ1, · · · , µN ).
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) is a canonical problem which considers the privacy of the
content downloaded from public databases. The problem is introduced by Chor et al. [1],
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111, CNS 15-26608 and CCF 17-
13977. A shorter version is submitted to IEEE ISIT 2018.
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and attracted considerable interest within the computer science community [1–5]. In the
classical PIR model, there are N replicated and non-colluding databases, each storing the
same set of M messages. A user requests to download a single file from the databases
privately, i.e., no database can know the identity of the user’s desired file. To that end, the
user submits a query to each database that does not leak any information about the identity
of the file. Each database responds with an answering string. From all answering strings,
the user should be able to decode the desired file reliably. PIR schemes are designed to be
more efficient than the trivial scheme of downloading all the files stored in the databases.
The efficiency is measured by the retrieval rate, which is the ratio between the number of
desired message symbols to the total number of downloaded symbols. PIR is important from
a practical point of view as many privacy threats exist in modern networks, in particular,
when advanced learning algorithms are employed within social networks and online shopping
websites. From a technical standpoint, PIR lies at the intersection of computer science,
information theory, coding theory, network coding, and signal processing.
There has been a growing interest in the PIR problem in the information-theory society,
with early examples [6–11]. In [12], Sun and Jafar investigate the fundamental limits of the
classical PIR problem by introducing the notion of PIR capacity. The PIR capacity is defined
as the supremum of PIR rates over all achievable retrieval schemes. [12] determines the exact
PIR capacity of the classical model to be C = (1 + 1
N
+ 1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NM−1
)−1. Following [12],
the fundamental limits of many interesting variants of the classical PIR problem have been
considered, such as: PIR from colluding databases, robust PIR, symmetric PIR, PIR from
MDS-coded databases, PIR for arbitrary message lengths, multi-round PIR, multi-message
PIR, PIR from Byzantine databases, secure symmetric PIR with adversaries, cache-aided
PIR, PIR with private side information (PSI), PIR for functions, storage constrained PIR,
PIR with asymmetric traffic constraints and their several combinations [13–40].
The sole requirement of most of these previous works is to protect the identity of the
desired message from the public databases in addition to satisfying the reliability constraint.
We ensure this protection via imposing the privacy constraint on the submitted queries.
Another interesting dimension to the PIR problem is when the content of the requested
message needs to be protected against an external eavesdropper (wiretapper), who wishes
to learn about the contents of the databases by observing the queries and answer strings
exchanged between the user and the databases. In this paper, we tackle the problem of secure
PIR. We impose an extra constraint to the PIR problem, namely, the secrecy constraint in
addition to the usual privacy constraint. The secrecy constraint ensures that the queries
and the answer strings do not leak any information about the contents of the databases to
the eavesdropper. Such systems are relevant in practice, for example, in the stock market,
investors need to keep the identity of the records that they are interested in private from the
public databases as revealing such interest in a specific record may change its value. This is a
classical PIR application. Now, consider the case when the contents of the records themselves
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are confidential except for a small subset of authorized investors. Thus, the queries and the
answer strings should be designed such that unauthorized entities who wiretap the retrieval
process learn absolutely nothing about the contents of these confidential records.
Although there is a vast literature on PIR, only a few works exist on secure PIR: [41]
considers the more general problem of information storage and retrieval, guaranteeing that
also the process of storing the information is secure in the presence of failing servers. [38]
considers a symmetric PIR setting where there is a passive eavesdropper who can tap in on
the incoming and outgoing transmissions of any E servers. [38] derives the PIR capacity in
this setting. Interestingly, the secret key needed for the symmetric retrieval process is used
as an encryption key to secure the contents of the databases from the eavesdropper. This
requires, as in the underlying symmetric PIR, that databases exchange a secret key of at
least a certain size. This problem is investigated further in [39] for the classical PIR problem
under T -privacy constraint for the case of E ≤ T . [39] derives inner and outer bounds for
this problem in addition to the minimum amount of common randomness required, which is
shared between the databases.
We study the secure PIR problem from a different angle than [38, 39, 41]. We consider a
classical PIR setting, where there are N replicated databases storing M messages. We as-
sume that the contents of the databases are fixed and cannot be coded to satisfy the security
constraint during the storage phase, unlike [41]. There are no shared keys in place required
for symmetric PIR unlike [38], as we consider classical PIR, not symmetric PIR. We further
assume that the eavesdropper observes the queries and the answer strings of all databases
through wiretap channels in contrast to observing the noiseless transmission from any E of
the databases as in [39]. In this work, we investigate the PIR problem through wiretap chan-
nel II (PIR-WTC-II). Ozarow and Wyner [42] introduced the wiretap channel II (WTC-II)
model, which considers a noiseless main channel and a binary erasure channel to the wire-
tapper, where the wiretapper is able to select the positions of erasures. In PIR-WTC-II (see
Fig. 1), the user observes the tn-length answer strings through a noiseless channel from the
nth database. The eavesdropper can observe a fraction µn from the nth answer string. More
specifically, the eavesdropper chooses any set of positions Sn ⊂ {1, · · · , tn} to observe from
the nth answer string, such that |Sn| = µntn. The databases should encode the answer strings
such that the eavesdropper learns nothing from observing any µn fraction of the traffic from
the nth database. This is in addition to normal privacy and reliability constraints. Naturally,
the nth database dedicates µntn portion of the answer string to confuse the eavesdropper,
constraining the meaningful portion of the answer to be (1− µn)tn. This fundamentally re-
lates PIR-WTC-II to the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints [40], as lengths
of answer strings can no longer be symmetric. This poses the following questions: How can
we design a retrieval code that satisfies the combined privacy and security constraints for
the PIR-WTC-II problem? Does PIR-WTC-II problem necessitate the existence of common
randomness between the databases as in [39]? Should the databases share any common
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randomness with the user (retriever)?
In this paper, we obtain a general upper bound for the PIR-WTC-II problem, when the
eavesdropper can wiretap µ = (µ1, · · · , µN) fractions from the traffic outgoing from every
database. We note first that this problem is the first concrete example of a PIR problem
under asymmetric traffic constraints in the sense of [40]. We show that this upper bound can
be expressed as a max-min problem. The inner minimization problem extends the converse
techniques of the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints in [40] to the PIR-
WTC-II problem. The outer problem maximizes the retrieval rate over all possible traffic
ratio vectors. For the achievability, we extend the achievable scheme used in [40] to achieve
the corner points for the meaningful portions of the queries. In the extension, to satisfy the
security constraint, each database generates a secret key with µntn length and encodes it
into an artificial noise vector using a (tn, µntn) MDS code and encrypts the returned answer
strings with the artificial noise vector. Interestingly, our achievable rate does not need any
shared randomness among the databases or between the databases and the user. The keys
used by the databases are unknown to the user, but are decodable and canceled at the
retriever; however, the same keys are not extractable at the wiretapper due to the MDS
code used and the existence of WTC-II. We express the achievable retrieval rate in terms
of the output of a system of difference equations. We present an explicit achievable rate for
the problem for the case of N = 2 databases and any arbitrary M . Our upper and lower
bounds match for M = 2 and M = 3 messages, for any N , and any µ, which conforms with
the results of [40].
2 System Model
Consider a classical PIR model, in which there are N non-colluding and replicated databases,
each storing the same content of M messages (or files). The message Wm is represented as a
vector of length L, whose elements are picked from a finite field FLq with a sufficiently large
alphabet. The messagesW1:M = {W1, · · · ,WM} are independent and identically distributed,
hence,
H(Wm) = L, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (1)
H(W1:M) =ML, (q-ary bits) (2)
We assume that the messages are uncoded and fixed, i.e., we assume that the contents of
the databases cannot be coded to satisfy the security constraint during the storage phase.
In classical PIR, a user wants to retrieve a message Wi from the N databases without
revealing the identity of the message i to any individual database. The user prepares N
queries, one for each database. The user sends Q
[i]
n to the nth database. Since the user has
no knowledge about the realization of W1:M , the queries and the messages are statistically
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independent, i.e.,
I(Q
[i]
1:N ;W1:M) = 0, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (3)
where Q
[i]
1:N = {Q
[i]
1 , · · · , Q
[i]
N}. Furthermore, to ensure the privacy of Wi, the user should
constrain the query intended to retrieve Wi to be indistinguishable from the query intended
to retrieve any other message Wj at any individual database. Thus, the privacy constraint
is formalized as,
(Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W1:M) ∼ (Q
[j]
n , A
[j]
n ,W1:M), ∀j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (4)
where ∼ denotes statistical equivalence.
The nth database, after receiving the query Q
[i]
n , responds with a tn-length answering
string A
[i]
n . Note that we allow the user and the databases to choose arbitrary lengths for the
answer strings such that they maximize the retrieval rate. The answer string is generally a
stochastic mapping of the messages W1:M and the received query Q
[i]
n , hence,
H(A[i]n |Q
[i]
n ,W1:M ,Gn) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (5)
where Gn is a random variable independent of all other random variables, whose realization
is known at the nth database only and not shared with any other database or the user a
priori of the transmission. We denote the traffic ratio vector by τ = (τ1, · · · , τN). The traffic
ratio at the nth database τn is given by,
τn =
tn∑N
i=1 ti
(6)
We assume that the answer strings are transmitted through a WTC-II (see Fig. 1).
In this case, an external eavesdropper (wiretapper) wishes to learn about the contents of
the databases by observing the queries and answer strings exchanged by the user and the
databases. In PIR-WTC-II, the user observes the tn-length answer string A
[i]
n from the nth
database through a noiseless channel. On the other hand, the eavesdropper can observe
a fraction µn from the nth answer string. More specifically, the eavesdropper arbitrarily
chooses any set of positions Sn ⊂ {1, · · · , tn} to observe from the nth answer string, such
that |Sn| = µntn, i.e., the output of the eavesdropper channel is given by,
Z [i]n = A
[i]
n (Sn), n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (7)
We denote the unobserved portion of the answer string by Y
[i]
n = A
[i]
n (S¯n), where S¯n =
{1, · · · , N} \ Sn, thus, A
[i]
n = (Y
[i]
n , Z
[i]
n ). We write the eavesdropping ratios as a vector
µ = (µ1, · · · , µN). Without loss of generality, we assume that the databases are arranged
ascendingly in µn, i.e., µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ · · · ≤ µN , i.e., the first database is the least threatened
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Figure 1: Secure PIR problem through wiretap channel II.
(most secure) and the Nth database is the most threatened (least secure).
Upon preparing the answer string, the databases should encode the answer strings such
that the eavesdropper learns nothing from observing any µn fraction from the traffic from
the nth database even with observing the queries submitted by the user. Consequently, we
write the security constraint as,
I(W1:M ;Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) = 0 (8)
Additionally, the user should be able to reconstruct the desired message Wi from the
collected answer strings with arbitrarily small probability of error. Using Fano’s inequality,
we write the reliability constraint as,
H(Wi|Q
[i]
1:N , A
[i]
1:N) = o(L) (9)
where o(L)
L
→ 0 as L→∞.
For a fixed N , M , traffic ratio vector τ , and eavesdropping ratio vector µ, a retrieval rate
R(τ ,µ) is achievable if there exists a PIR scheme which satisfies the privacy constraint (4),
security constraint (8), and the reliability constraint (9) for some message length L(τ ,µ)
and answer strings of lengths {tn(τ ,µ)}
N
n=1 such that τn =
tn(τ ,µ)
∑N
i=1 ti(τ ,µ)
, where the retrieval
rate is therefore given by,
R(τ ,µ) =
L(τ ,µ)∑N
n=1 tn(τ ,µ)
(10)
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We note that in this problem, the user and the databases can agree on a traffic ratio vec-
tor τ to maximize the retrieval rate, thus, we can express the secure retrieval rate under
eavesdropping capabilities µ, R(µ), as,
R(µ) = max
τ
R(τ ,µ) (11)
Note that the message lengths can grow arbitrarily large to conform with standard information-
theoretic arguments. The capacity of the PIR-WTC-II problem C(µ) is defined as the supre-
mum of all achievable retrieval rates over all achievable schemes, i.e., C(µ) = sup R(µ).
3 Main Results and Discussions
In this section, we present the main results of this paper. Our first result characterizes a
general upper bound for the PIR-WTC-II problem for fixed M , N , and an arbitrary µ.
Theorem 1 (Upper bound) For the PIR-WTC-II problem under eavesdropping capabili-
ties µ = (µ1, · · · , µN), the capacity is upper bounded by,
C(µ) ≤ C¯(µ) = max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(12)
where T =
{
τ : τn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [1 : N ],
∑N
n=1 τn = 1
}
.
The proof of this upper bound is given in Section 4. We have the following remarks.
Remark 1 When µ = (0, · · · , 0), i.e., without any security constraints, the upper bound
reduces to:
C¯(µ) = max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1 τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(13)
= max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
1 +
∑N
n=n1+1
τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(14)
= max
τ
C˜(τ ) (15)
=
1
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NM−1
(16)
where the inner problem in (14) is precisely the upper bound of the PIR problem under
asymmetric traffic τ [40]. From [40], we know that C˜(τ ) is maximized by adopting symmetric
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schemes, i.e., τn =
1
N
, which achieves the PIR capacity C in [12].
Remark 2 If the PIR-WTC-II problem is further constrained by the asymmetric traffic
constraints τ , the corresponding upper bound C¯(µ, τ ) is given by the inner problem of (12),
i.e.,
C¯(µ, τ ) = min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(17)
Hence, without the asymmetric traffic constraints, the user and the databases can agree on
τ that maximizes the retrieval rate, which results in the outer maximization over τ . This is
reminiscent of the classical converse proof for the channel coding theorem, where a converse
argument is constructed for an arbitrary input distribution of the transmission codebook, and
then the converse proof is concluded with a maximization step over all the input distributions.
Remark 3 The upper bound C¯(µ) in Theorem 1 can be written as the following linear
programming problem:
C¯(µ) = max
τ ,R
R
s.t. R ≤
∑N
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
, ∀n
τn ≥ 0, n = 1, · · · , N
N∑
n=1
τn = 1 (18)
where n = (n1, · · · , nM−1) ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M−1, i.e., the number of constraints are finite (at
most NM−1 + 2 constraints). Hence, the optimal solution of this optimization problem is
attained at one of the corner points of the feasible set.
Next, we present a general lower bound on C(µ) for fixed M , N .
Theorem 2 (Lower bound) For PIR-WTC-II, for a monotone non-decreasing sequence
n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M , let n−1 = 0, and S = {i ≥ 0 : ni − ni−1 > 0}. Denote
yℓ[k] to be the number of stages of the achievable scheme that downloads k-sums from the
nth database in one repetition of the scheme, such that nℓ−1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ, and ℓ ∈ S. Let
ξℓ =
∏
s∈S\{ℓ}
(
M−2
s−1
)
. The number of stages yℓ[k] is characterized by the following system of
difference equations:
y0[k] = (n0−1)y0[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{0}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
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y1[k] = (n1−n0−1)y1[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{1}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
yℓ[k] = n0ξℓδ[k−ℓ−1] + (nℓ−nℓ−1−1)yℓ[k − 1] +
∑
j∈S\{ℓ}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1], ℓ ≥ 2 (19)
where δ[·] denotes the Kronecker delta function. The initial conditions of (19) are y0[1] =∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
, and yj[k] = 0 for k ≤ j. Consequently, the traffic ratio vector τ (n) =
(τ1(n), · · · , τN(n)) corresponding to the sequence n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 is given by:
τn(n) =
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yj[k]∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)
, nj−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ nj (20)
Then, the achievable rate corresponding to n is given by:
R(n,µ) =
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
1−µn
(21)
Consequently, the capacity C(µ) is lower bounded by:
C(µ) ≥ R(µ) = max
n0≤···≤nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
R(n,µ) (22)
= max
n0≤···≤nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
1−µn
(23)
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Section 5. We have the following remarks.
Remark 4 For fixed M , N , the number of the achievable rates R(n,µ) in Theorem 2 cor-
responds to the number of monotone non-decreasing sequences n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 , which is equal
to
(
M+N−1
M
)
.
Remark 5 After achieving the corner points in Theorem 2, which achieve R(n,µ), one can
perform time-sharing between the corner points to obtain an achievable R(τ ,µ) for any τ .
The highest possible achievable rate can be obtained by maximizing over τ . However, this is
not needed as time-sharing results in a piece-wise affine function in τ . Hence, maximizing
over τ would result in operating directly at one of the corner points.
Remark 6 We note that the core of the achievability scheme is the PIR scheme under asym-
metric traffic constraints in [40]. Hence, the recursive structure described by (19) is directly
inherited from [40]. Nevertheless, two main differences appear in the final rate expression.
First, the answer string length from every database belonging to the same group is different
in contrast to [40]. This is due to the fact that every database experiences a different eaves-
dropping capability µn in general, hence the nth database encrypts its responses with a key,
9
group 1
1−µn1
n0
1−µn0
n0+1
1−µ1
n0+1
n0n1
1−µn0+1
n0
group 0
+
−
C(µ)
. . . . . .
Figure 2: Circuit interpretation of C(µ) for M = 2.
whose length depends on µn, thus the key lengths are different in general. Second, there is
no need for time-sharing over the corner points as shown in Remark 5.
In the following corollary, we settle the capacity C(µ) for M = 2, M = 3, and arbitrary
N .
Corollary 1 (Exact capacity for M = 2 and M = 3 messages) For PIR-WTC-II, the
capacity C(µ) for M = 2, 3, and an arbitrary N is given by:
C(µ) =


maxn0,n1∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1∑n0
n=1
n0+1
1−µn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0
1−µn
, M = 2
maxn0,n1,n2∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1n2∑n0
n=1
n0n1+n0+1
1−µn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0n1+n0
1−µn
+
∑n2
n=n1+1
n0n1
1−µn
, M = 3
(24)
The proof of Corollary 1 can be found in Section 5.4.
Remark 7 The explicit capacity expressions in Corollary 1 can be interpreted using basic
circuit theory. To see that for M = 2 for a given (n0, n1), consider the circuit in Fig. 2. The
circuit has a current source of n0n1 units. The circuit consists of n0 + n1 parallel resistors.
The nth resistor has the value of Rn =
1−µn
n0+1
if 1 ≤ n ≤ n0, and Rn =
1−µn
n0
if n0+1 ≤ n ≤ n1.
Hence, the capacity C(µ) is the voltage across the current source. A similar interpretation
can be inferred from Fig. 3 for the case of M = 3. Interestingly, this interpretation implies
that in order to maximize the retrieval rate (the voltage across the equivalent resistance of
the circuit), one should pick n0, n1, n2 such that the resistance of each parallel branch is
as symmetric as possible. This is due to the fact that the equivalent resistance of parallel
resistors is less than the resistance of the least resistor.
Finally, in the next corollary, we present an explicit achievable rate for R(µ) when N = 2,
and an arbitrary M . The proof of the corollary can be found in Section 5.5
Corollary 2 (Achievable retrieval rate for N = 2) For PIR-WTC-II with N = 2 and
an arbitrary M , let s2 = {1, · · · ,M−1}, then the secure PIR capacity C(µ) is lower bounded
10
1−µn2
n0n1
group 2
. . . +
−
C(µ)
group 0 group 1
n0n1n2
1−µn0
n0n1+n0+1
1−µ1
n0n1+n0+1
1−µn1+1
n0n1
1−µn0+1
n0n1+n0
1−µn1
n0n1+n0
. . . . . .
Figure 3: Circuit interpretation of C(µ) for M = 3.
by:
max


1− µ1
M
, max
s2∈{0,··· ,M−1}
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
k=0
(
M−1
s2+k
)
1
1−µ1
[
M
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑⌊M−s22 ⌋
k=1
(
M
s2+2k
)]
+ 1
1−µ2
[∑⌊M−s2−12 ⌋
k=0
(
M
s2+2k+1
)]


(25)
Remark 8 We note the strong connection between the PIR-WTC-II problem and the PIR
problem under asymmetric traffic constraints in [40]. In PIR-WTC-II problem, the nth
database uses a secret key of length µntn to span the entire space of the eavesdropper. This in
turn leaves (1−µn)tn symbols for meaningful queries. Since the eavesdropping vulnerabilities
of the databases are different in general (different µn), the meaningful queries are naturally
constrained, e.g., we expect the first database (the most secure) to support more meaningful
queries than the remaining databases. However, the main difference between the two problems
is that in the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints [40], the traffic ratio vector
τ is fixed (by the problem formulation) in contrast to the PIR-WTC-II problem, where the
user and the databases can agree on a traffic ratio vector τ to maximize the retrieval rate
under the fixed eavesdropping capabilities µ.
Remark 9 We now compare our model with the PIR model in [38,39]. In [38,39], there is an
eavesdropper, which observes all communication of E out of N databases, whose identities are
unknown to the user. We restrict the comparison to the case T = 1 (i.e., no collusion between
the databases). In this case, the capacity of the secure PIR problem in [39] (abbreviated as
T-EPIR problem) is 1 − E
N
. This requires a common randomness, which is shared between
the databases and unknown to the user, of length E
N−E
[39, Theorem 1]. We note that the
capacity expression is independent of the number of messages in [39]. For the symmetric
version of the problem in [38], the capacity expression is also 1 − E
N
. Interestingly, in the
symmetric version of the problem, the common randomness among the databases is used to
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satisfy both the database privacy and the security constraints simultaneously.
On the other hand, in our model, the eavesdropper wiretaps all N databases according to
the given µ = (µ1, · · · , µN). The user knows the ratio of the traffic which is observed by the
eavesdropper from each database, i.e., µ = (µ1, · · · , µN), but does not know which positions
are being observed. Surprisingly, our model does not need any shared randomness among the
databases or with the user, i.e., here we are able to achieve nontrivial PIR rates with zero
shared randomness rates.
As a concrete example, let M = 3, and for a fair comparison, let µn =
E
N
for all n ∈
{1, · · · , N} in our model. The rationale for this choice of µn is that in [39], the eavesdropper
has access to a total of E · t observations, where t is the length of the answer string from any
database in [39]. Now, for symmetric µn =
E
N
in our model, all answer string lengths need
to be symmetric, i.e., tn = t for all n, and therefore, the eavesdropper accesses a total of
E
N
·N · t = E · t observations here as it does in [39]. The capacity for this case in our model,
from Corollary 1, is
1−E
N
1+ 1
N
+ 1
N2
, which is attained with n0 = n1 = n2 = N in the corollary.
This rate is strictly less than the rate in [39], which is 1− E
N
, however, [39] requires a shared
randomness between the databases at a rate of at least E
N−E
, while in our case no shared
randomness is required.
4 Converse Proof
In this section, we derive a general upper bound for the retrieval rate under the privacy and
security constraints (4), (8) for the PIR-WTC-II problem. Our converse proof extends the
techniques of [12] to incorporate the security constraint. In addition, since the eavesdropper
observes a different fraction of the traffic from each database, we do not expect that the
answer strings (and consequently the traffic ratios) from each database to be symmetric in
length. Thus, we modify the converse proof in [12] to account for this prospected traffic
asymmetry along the lines of [40]. However, different from [40], traffic ratios are not given,
and must be chosen; the eavesdropping ratios µ = (µ1, · · · , µN) are given here. Our converse
proof extends the proof in [40] to account for the imposed security constraint.
In the next lemma, we discuss some consequences of the security constraint in (8). The
security constraint introduces some interesting conditional independence properties which
simplify the converse proof.
Lemma 1 (Security consequences) In the PIR-WTC-II problem, the following implica-
tions are true due to the security constraint (8):
1. Messages are conditionally independent given the observed part of the answer strings
at the eavesdropper Z
[i]
1:N , i.e.,
I(Wm;W[1:M ]\{m}|Z
[i]
1:N) = 0, i, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (26)
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2. There is no leakage of Wm from all the queries Q
[i]
1:N , the eavesdropper observations
Z
[i]
1:N , and any subset of messages WS = {Wi : i ∈ S} such that m /∈ S,
I(Wm;WS , Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) = 0, i, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (27)
In particular,
I(Wm;Wm:M |W1:m−1, Z
[i]
1:N) = L, i, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (28)
3. The eavesdropper’s observations Z
[i]
1:N and the messages are conditionally independent
given the queries Q
[i]
1:N , i.e., for sets S1, S2, such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅,
I(WS1;Z
[i]
1:N |Q
[i]
1:N ,WS2) = 0, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (29)
In particular,
I(Wm:M ;Z
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1) = 0, m ∈ {2, · · · ,M} (30)
4. The messages and the queries are conditionally independent given the eavesdropper’s
observations, i.e., for sets S1, S2, such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅,
I(WS1;Q
[i]
1:N |WS2, Z
[i]
1:N) = 0, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (31)
5. The messages Wm:M and the queries Q
[m]
k+1:N for any k ∈ {1, · · · , N} are conditionally
independent given
(
W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k , Y
[m]
1:k
)
, i.e.,
I(Wm:M ;Q
[m]
k+1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k , Y
[m]
1:k ) = 0 (32)
Proof:
1. From the security constraint (8), we have I(W1:M ;Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) = 0, which further im-
plies that I(W1:M ;Z
[i]
1:N) = 0. This can be expanded as:
0 = I(Wm,W[1:M ]\{m};Z
[i]
1:N) (33)
= I(Wm;Z
[i]
1:N) + I(W[1:M ]\{m};Z
[i]
1:N |Wm) (34)
= I(W[1:M ]\{m};Z
[i]
1:N) + I(Wm;Z
[i]
1:N |W[1:M ]\{m}) (35)
which implies that all four terms in (34), (35) are zero. Then, consider
I(Wm;W[1:M ]\{m}, Z
[i]
1:n) = I(Wm;Z
[i]
1:N) + I(Wm;W[1:M ]\{m}|Z
[i]
1:N) (36)
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= I(Wm;W[1:M ]\{m}) + I(Wm;Z
[i]
1:N |W[1:M ]\{m}) (37)
which together with (34), (35) and the independence of the messages imply (26).
2. From the security constraint (8), we have I(Wm,WS ;Q
[i]
1:N , Z
[i]
1:N) = 0 by the non-
negativity of mutual information. This can be further expanded as
0 = I(Wm,WS ;Q
[i]
1:N , Z
[i]
1:N) = I(WS ;Q
[i]
1:N , Z
[i]
1:N) + I(Wm;Q
[i]
1:N , Z
[i]
1:N |WS) (38)
From the second term on the right hand side, we have I(Wm;Q
[i]
1:N , Z
[i]
1:N |WS) = 0,
which implies (27) by the independence of the messages, as I(Wm;WS , Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) =
I(Wm;WS) + I(Wm;Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N |WS).
For (28), we note that (27) implies that I(Wm;W1:m−1, Z
[i]
1:N) = 0 by the non-negativity
of mutual information, which further implies that I(Wm;Z
[i]
1:N |W1:m−1) = 0. Now,
I(Wm;Wm:M |W1:m−1, Z
[i]
1:N) =H(Wm|W1:m−1, Z
[i]
1:N) (39)
=H(Wm|W1:m−1)− I(Wm;Z
[i]
1:N |W1:m−1) (40)
=L (41)
where the last equality follows from the independence of the messages.
3. From the security constraint (8) and the non-negativity of mutual information, we
have I(WS1 ,WS2;Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) = 0, which can be expanded as I(WS2 ;Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) +
I(WS1;Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N |WS2) = 0, which implies that I(WS1;Z
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N |WS2) = 0. We futher
expand it as:
0 = I(WS1;Q
[i]
1:N |WS2) + I(WS1;Z
[i]
1:N |Q
[i]
1:N ,WS2) (42)
which leads to (29) by the non-negativity of mutual information.
For (30), we note from (29) that I(Wm:M ;Z
[m−1]
1:N |Q
[m−1]
1:N ,W1:m−1) = 0, hence
0 = I(Wm:M ;Z
[m−1]
1:N , Q
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1)− I(Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1) (43)
Now, I(Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1) = 0 by the independence of the messages and the queries
in (3), and this implies (30) by the non-negativity of mutual information.
4. Using the same argument as in item 3 above and reversing the order of the chain rule
in (42) leads to (31).
5. We have
I(Wm:M ;Q
[m]
k+1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k , Y
[m]
1:k )
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=I(Wm:M ;Q
[m]
k+1:N , Y
[m]
1:k |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k )− I(Wm:M ; Y
[m]
1:k |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k ) (44)
=I(Wm:M ;Q
[m]
k+1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k ) + I(Wm:M ; Y
[m]
1:k |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:N)
− I(Wm:M ; Y
[m]
1:k |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k ) (45)
=0 (46)
where I(Wm:M ;Q
[m]
k+1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k ) = 0 from (31) and the non-negativity of
mutual information, and since Q
[m]
1:N → Q
[m]
1:k → Y
[m]
1:k is a Markov chain, we have
I(Wm:M ; Y
[m]
1:k |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:N) = I(Wm:M ;Y
[m]
1:k |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N , Q
[m]
1:k ).

We will need the following lemma, which characterizes a lower bound on the interference
from the undesired messages within the portion of answers that is unobserved by the eaves-
dropper (and hence secure). Since the user must download at least L symbols to retrieve the
desired message, the difference
∑N
n=1(1 − µn)tn − L denotes the interference terms within
the unobserved (by the eavesdropper) portion of the answers.
Lemma 2 (Interference lower bound) For the PIR-WTC-II problem, the interference
from undesired messages within the unobserved portion of the answer strings by the eaves-
dropper
∑N
n=1(1− µn)tn − L is lower bounded by,
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)tn − L+ o(L) ≥ I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , Y
[1]
1:N |W1, Z
[1]
1:N
)
(47)
We note that Lemma 2 is a generalization of [12, Lemma 5] to the problem of PIR-WTC-
II. If µn = 0 for all n ∈ [1 : N ], then Lemma 2 reduces to [12, Lemma 5] as Z
[1]
1:N (the
eavesdropper observations) is absent and Y
[1]
1:N = A
[i]
1:N in that case.
Proof: We start with the right hand side of (47),
I(W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , Y
[1]
1:N |W1, Z
[1]
1:N)
(26)
= I
(
W2:M ;W1, Q
[1]
1:N , Y
[1]
1:N |Z
[1]
1:N
)
(48)
=I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , Y
[1]
1:N |Z
[1]
1:N
)
+ I
(
W2:M ;W1|A
[1]
1:N , Q
[1]
1:N
)
(49)
(9)
=I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , Y
[1]
1:N |Z
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (50)
(31)
= I
(
W2:M ; Y
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (51)
=H
(
Y
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N
)
−H
(
Y
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N ,W2:M
)
+ o(L) (52)
≤
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)tn−H
(
W1, Y
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N ,Z
[1]
1:N ,W2:M
)
+H
(
W1|A
[1]
1:N ,Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:M
)
+o(L) (53)
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(9)
=
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)tn −H
(
W1, Y
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N ,W2:M
)
+ o(L) (54)
=
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)tn−H
(
W1|Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N ,W2:M
)
−H
(
Y
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N ,W1:M
)
+o(L) (55)
≤
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)tn−H
(
W1|Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N ,W2:M
)
+ o(L) (56)
(27)
=
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)tn − L+ o(L) (57)
where (48) follows from the conditional independence of messages in Lemma 1, (50), (54)
follow from the decodability of W1 given (Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N), (51) follows from the conditional
independence of the messages and the queries in Lemma 1, (53) follows from conditioning
reduces entropy and the fact that H(Y
[1]
1:N) ≤
∑N
n=1(1− µn)tn from the WTC-II model, (56)
follows from the non-negativity of the entropy function, and (57) follows from zero leakage
property of W1 from (27) which implies H(W1|Q
[1]
1:N , Z
[1]
1:N ,W2:M) = H(W1) = L. 
In the following lemma, we derive an induction relation for the right hand side of the
expression in (47). This lemma extends [12, Lemma 6] in two major ways. First, we incor-
porate the security constraint in the proof by observing that (W1:M , Z
[m]
1:N) are independent.
Second, and more significantly, the main difference between this lemma and [12, Lemma 6]
is the fact that not all databases can use a symmetric scheme due to the asymmetry of the
fraction that the eavesdropper can observe. Consequently, we denote nm−1 to be the num-
ber of databases that can apply a symmetric scheme when the retrieval problem is reduced
to retrieving message Wm−1 from the set of Wm−1:M messages. For the remaining answer
strings, we directly bound them by their corresponding length of the unobserved portion∑N
n=nm−1+1
(1− µn)tn.
Lemma 3 (Induction lemma) For all m ∈ {2, . . . ,M} and for an arbitrary nm−1 ∈
{1, · · · , N}, the mutual information term in Lemma 2 can be inductively lower bounded
as,
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N , Y
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m−1]
1:N
)
≥
1
nm−1
[
I
(
Wm+1:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m, Z
[m]
1:N
)
+
(
L−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
(1− µn)tn
)
− o(L)
]
(58)
Proof: We start with the left hand side of (58), after multiplying by nm−1,
nm−1 I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N , Y
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m−1]
1:N
)
(30)
= nm−1 I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N , A
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
(59)
16
≥ nm−1 I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:nm−1 , A
[m−1]
1:nm−1 |W1:m−1
)
(60)
≥
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
n , A
[m−1]
n |W1:m−1
)
(61)
(4)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
n , A
[m]
n |W1:m−1
)
(62)
(3)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;A
[m]
n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:m−1
)
(63)
(29)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ; Y
[m]
n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:m−1, Z
[m]
n
)
(64)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
H
(
Y [m]n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:m−1, Z
[m]
n
)
−H
(
Y [m]n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:M , Z
[m]
n
)
(65)
≥
nm−1∑
n=1
H
(
Y [m]n |Y
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1 ,W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
−H
(
Y [m]n |Y
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1,W1:M , Z
[m]
1:N
)
(66)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ; Y
[m]
n |Y
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1 ,W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
(67)
= I
(
Wm:M ; Y
[m]
1:nm−1
|Q
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
(68)
(31)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:nm−1 , Y
[m]
1:nm−1|W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
(69)
(32)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
− I
(
Wm:M ; Y
[m]
nm−1+1:N
|Q[m]1:N , Y
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
(70)
≥ I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
−H
(
Y
[m]
nm−1+1:N
)
(71)
≥ I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
(1− µn)tn (72)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Wm, Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
− I
(
Wm:M ;Wm|W1:m−1, Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
1:N
)
−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
(1− µn)tn (73)
(9)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Wm, Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
(1− µn)tn − o(L) (74)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Wm|W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
+ I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m, Z
[m]
1:N
)
−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
(1− µn)tn − o(L) (75)
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(28)
= I
(
Wm+1:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:N |W1:m, Z
[m]
1:N
)
+
(
L−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
(1− µn)tn
)
− o(L) (76)
where (59) follows from the conditional independence of the messages and Z
[m−1]
1:N in (30) as a
consequence of the security constraint, (60), (61) follow from the non-negativity of mutual in-
formation, (62) follows from the privacy constraint, (63) follows from the independence of the
queries and the messages, (64) follows from the conditional independence of the messages and
Z
[m]
n in (29) and the non-negativity of mutual information, (66) follows from conditioning re-
duces entropy and
(
Q
[m]
1:nm−1 , Z
[m]
1:N ,W1:M , Y
[m]
1:n−1
)
→
(
Q
[m]
n ,W1:M , Z
[n]
n
)
→ Y
[m]
n , (69) follows
from (31) and the non-negativity of mutual information, (70) follows from the chain rule
and (32), (71) follows from the fact that I
(
Wm:M ; Y
[m]
nm−1+1:N
|Q
[m]
1:N , Y
[m]
1:nm−1,W1:m−1, Z
[m]
1:N
)
≤
H
(
Y
[m]
1:nm−1
)
, (72) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy andH(Y
[m]
nm−1+1:N
) ≤∑N
n=nm−1+1
(1−µn)tn in the WTC-II model, (74) follows from the reliability constraint, (76)
follows from the no leakage property of Wm from (28) as a consequence of the security
constraint. Finally, dividing both sides by nm−1 leads to (58). 
Now, we are ready to prove an explicit upper bound for the retrieval rate in the PIR-
WTC-II problem R(µ) by applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 successively. For a pre-specified
answer string lengths {tn}
N
n=1, and an arbitrary sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 , we can write
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)tn − L+ o˜(L)
(47)
≥ I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , Y
[1]
1:N |W1, Z
[1]
1:N
)
(77)
(58)
≥
1
n1
(
L−
N∑
n=n1+1
(1− µn)tn
)
+
1
n1
I
(
W3:M ;Q
[2]
1:N , Y
[2]
1:N |W1:2, Z
[2]
1:N
)
(78)
(58)
≥
1
n1
(
L−
N∑
n=n1+1
(1− µn)tn
)
+
1
n1n2
(
L−
N∑
n=n2+1
(1− µn)tn
)
+
1
n2
I
(
W4:M ;Q
[3]
1:N , Y
[3]
1:N |W1:3, Z
[3]
1:N
)
(79)
(58)
≥ . . .
(58)
≥
1
n1
(
L−
N∑
n=n1+1
(1− µn)tn
)
+
1
n1n2
(
L−
N∑
n=n2+1
(1− µn)tn
)
+ · · ·
+
1∏M−1
i=1 ni

L− N∑
n=nM−1+1
(1− µn)tn

 (80)
where o˜(L) =
(
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
o(L), (77) follows from Lemma 2, and the
remaining bounding steps follow from successive application of Lemma 3.
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Ordering terms and letting τn =
tn∑N
i=1 ti
, we have,
(
1 +
1
n1
+
1
n1n2
+· · ·+
1∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
L ≤
(
φ(0) +
φ(n1)
n1
+· · ·+
φ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
N∑
n=1
tn+o˜(L) (81)
where φ(ℓ) =
∑N
n=ℓ+1(1 − µn)τn corresponds to the sum of the unobserved traffic ratios by
the eavesdropper from databases [ℓ+ 1 : N ].
We conclude the proof by taking L → ∞. Thus, for an arbitrary sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 we
have
R(τ ,µ) =
L∑N
n=1 tn
≤
φ(0) + φ(n1)
n1
+ φ(n2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+ φ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(82)
The bound in (82) for R(τ ,µ) is valid for any arbitrary sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 . Hence, we obtain
the tightest upper bound for R(τ ,µ) by minimizing over the sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 over the set
{1, · · · , N} to get
R(τ ,µ) ≤ min
n1,··· ,nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
φ(0) + φ(n1)
n1
+ φ(n2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+ φ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(83)
Finally, since the user and the databases can choose any suitable traffic ratio vector τ in
the set T such that:
T =
{
τ : τn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [1 : N ],
N∑
n=1
τn = 1
}
(84)
by maximizing over τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τN ) in the set T, we obtain the following upper bound
for R(µ),
R(µ) ≤ max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
φ(0) + φ(n1)
n1
+ φ(n2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+ φ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(85)
= max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(86)
5 Achievable Scheme
In this section, we present a general achievable scheme for PIR-WTC-II. The scheme builds
on the achievable scheme in [40]. The main idea of the achievable scheme is that since
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the databases are eavesdropped by varying eavesdropping capabilities µ, then it would be
beneficial for the user to query the databases using the PIR scheme under asymmetric traffic
constraints. Furthermore, the databases should encrypt the answers such that the user
can decode the meaningful transmission by observing the entire answer string, while the
encryption keys span the eavesdropper’s entire observation space, ensuring the security of
downloaded content. The user and the databases agree on the traffic ratio vector τ that
maximizes the achievable secure PIR rate.
In the following, we illustrate the main ingredients of the achievable scheme by presenting
the case of M = 3 messages and N = 2 databases for an arbitrary µ.
5.1 Motivating Example: M = 3 Messages, N = 2 Databases
In this section, we first show an explicit upper bound for the capacity expression C¯(µ).
Then, we show the capacity-achieving scheme for the concrete example of µ = (1
4
, 1
2
). We
conclude this section by showing how to extend the achievable scheme for arbitrary µ.
5.1.1 Explicit Upper Bound for M = 3 Messages, N = 2 Databases
From Theorem 1, the upper bound of C¯(µ) is given by:
C¯(µ) = max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,2}
∑2
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑2
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+
∑2
n=n2+1
(1−µn)τn
n1n2
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
(87)
By observing that τ1 = 1 − τ2, this can be explicitly written as the following linear
program:
max
τ2,R
R
s.t. R ≤
1
3
(1− µ1) +
[
(1− µ2)−
1
3
(1− µ1)
]
τ2
R ≤
2
5
(1− µ1) +
[
4
5
(1− µ2)−
2
5
(1− µ1)
]
τ2
R ≤
4
7
(1− µ1) +
[
4
7
(1− µ2)−
4
7
(1− µ1)
]
τ2
0 ≤ τ2 ≤ 1 (88)
Note that the bound corresponding to n1 = 2, n2 = 1 is not included in (88) as it would
be inactive for any µ. Since (88) is a linear program, the optimal solution exists among
the corner points of the feasible region. The first corner point, is τ
(1)
2 = 0, which leads to
the bound C¯(µ) ≤ 1−µ1
3
. The second corner point occurs at the intersection of the first two
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constraints, i.e., τ
(2)
2 satisfies:
1
3
(1− µ1) +
[
(1− µ2)−
1
3
(1− µ1)
]
τ
(2)
2 =
2
5
(1− µ1) +
[
4
5
(1− µ2)−
2
5
(1− µ1)
]
τ
(2)
2 (89)
which leads to,
τ
(2)
2 =
(1− µ1)
3(1− µ2) + (1− µ1)
(90)
with a corresponding bound of C¯(µ) ≤ 2(1−µ1)(1−µ2)
3(1−µ2)+(1−µ1)
. Similarly, the third corner point τ
(3)
2
occurs at the intersection of the second and third constraints, hence τ
(3)
2 =
3(1−µ1)
4(1−µ2)+3(1−µ1)
with the corresponding bound of C¯(µ) ≤ 4(1−µ1)(1−µ2)
4(1−µ2)+3(1−µ1)
. Finally, at τ2 = 1, we have the
bound C¯(µ) ≤ 4(1−µ2)
7
which is no larger than 4(1−µ1)(1−µ2)
4(1−µ2)+3(1−µ1)
by the monotonicity of µ, hence
it can be ignored.
Consequently, the explicit upper bound for M = 3, N = 2 is given by
C¯(µ) = max
{
1− µ1
3
,
2(1− µ1)(1− µ2)
3(1− µ2) + (1− µ1)
,
4(1− µ1)(1− µ2)
4(1− µ2) + 3(1− µ1)
}
(91)
5.1.2 Concrete Example: µ1 =
1
4
, µ2 =
1
2
Before the retrieval process, the user permutes the indices of the symbols of W1, W2, W3
independently, uniformly, and privately. Assume without loss of generality that W1 is the
desired message. Let ai, bi, ci be the permuted symbols from W1, W2, W3, respectively. In
the case of µ1 =
1
4
, µ2 =
1
2
, the explicit upper bound in (91) is C¯(µ) = 4(1−µ1)(1−µ2)
4(1−µ2)+3(1−µ1)
= 6
17
.
To achieve this bound, we focus first on the meaningful queries, i.e., the queries without
the randomness that is added to satisfy the security constraint. From the first database,
the user asks for an individual symbol from every message, i.e., asks for a1, b1, c1. From
database 2, the user does not ask for new individual symbols but rather exploits the side
information that is generated from database 1 to query for 2-sums from database 2, i.e., the
user asks for a2 + b1, a3 + c1, b2 + c2 from database 2. Then, the user exploits b2 + c2 as side
information to ask for a4+b2+c2 from database 1. To get an integer number of downloads for
the meaningful queries, which covers (1− µn)tn from the downloaded symbols from the nth
database, the scheme is repeated ν times. Since this scheme gets 4 symbols from database 1
and 3 symbols from database 2, we choose the repetition factor of the scheme ν such that:
(1− µ1)t1 = 4ν ⇒ t1 =
16ν
3
(92)
(1− µ2)t2 = 3ν ⇒ t2 = 6ν (93)
Then, the minimal ν is ν = 3. Database 1 generates the independent keysK1 =
(
k
(1)
1 , · · · , k
(1)
4
)
,
such that K1 is picked uniformly from F
4
q . Database 1 encodes these random keys using a
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(16, 4) MDS code, to get u[1:16], i.e.,
u[1:16] = MDS16×4K1 (94)
Similarly, database 2 generates K2 =
(
k
(2)
1 , · · · , k
(2)
9
)
uniformly from F9q. Database 2
encodes the keys using an (18, 9) MDS code, to get v[1:16], i.e.,
v[1:18] = MDS18×9K2 (95)
Now, all the meaningful downloads are encrypted by the coded keys. Furthermore, the
user downloads u[13:16] separately from database 1, and v[10:18] from database 2. The query
table is shown in Table. 1.
Table 1: The query table for M = 3, N = 2, µ1 =
1
4
, µ2 =
1
2
.
Database 1 Database 2
a1 + u1 a2 + b1 + v1
b1 + u2 a3 + c1 + v2
c1 + u3 b2 + c2 + v3
a4 + b2 + c2 + u4
a5 + u5 a6 + b3 + v4
b3 + u6 a7 + c3 + v5
c3 + u7 b4 + c4 + v6
a8 + b4 + c4 + u8
a9 + u9 a10 + b5 + v7
b5 + u10 a11 + c5 + v8
c5 + u11 b6 + c6 + v9
a12 + b6 + c6 + u12
u13, u14, u15, u16 v10, u11, u12, u13, v14
v15, u16, u17, u18
For the decodability, since database 1 encodes its keys K1 using a (16, 4) MDS code,
by the MDS property, any 4 symbols suffice to reconstruct u[1:16]. The user downloads
u[13:16] separately, hence u[1:12] can be reconstructed and canceled from the downloads to
get the meaningful information only. Similarly, database 2 encodes the keys K2 using an
(18, 9) MDS code, hence v[10:18] suffice to reconstruct v[1:9] and can be canceled from the
meaningful downloads. Furthermore, since the side information at any database is obtained
from the undesired symbols downloaded from the second database, all undesired symbols
can be canceled and the user is left only with a[1:12], which are the desired symbols.
For the security, since µ1 =
1
4
and µ2 =
1
2
, the eavesdropper can obtain any 4 symbols
out of total 16 downloaded symbols from database 1, and any 9 symbols out of total 18
downloaded symbols from database 2. Since K1, K2 are generated uniformly and indepen-
dently from F4q, F
9
q, respectively, any 4 symbols (ui1, · · · , ui4) from u[1:16] are independent
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and uniformly distributed over Fq, and similarly for any 9 symbols (vj1 , · · · , vj9) from v[1:18].
Consequently, the leakage at the eavesdropper is upper bounded by:
I(W1:3;Z
[1]
1:2) = H(Z1:2)−H(Z1:2|W1:3) (96)
≤ logq 13−H




ui1
...
ui4
vj1
...
vj9




= 0 (97)
For the privacy, as all combinations of the sums are included in the queries and the indices
of the message symbols are uniformly and independently permuted, the privacy constraint is
satisfied. Hence, the user downloads t1 = 16 symbols from database 1, and t2 = 18 symbols
from database 2. From these downloads, the user can decode L = 12 symbols from W1.
Hence, R = 12
34
= 6
17
, which matches the upper bound.
5.1.3 Achieving the Upper Bound for Arbitrary µ
Now, we show how to achieve the upper bound in (91) for general µ. As shown in the
example of µ1 =
1
4
, µ2 =
1
2
, the user downloads µ1t1 as individual symbols from the coded
keys from database 1, and µ2t2 as individual symbols from the coded keys from database 2.
This leaves (1 − µ1)t1, (1 − µ2)t2, respectively for meaningful symbols. Furthermore, each
scheme should be repeated ν times to ensure that t1, t2 ∈ N. In the following, we focus on
the meaningful symbols without the coded keys. We show only one repetition of the scheme.
For R(µ) = 1−µ1
3
: To achieve this rate, the user applies the trivial retrieval scheme [1], and
downloads all messages from database 1, i.e., the user downloads a1, b1, c1 from database 1.
Hence, t2 = 0 and
(1− µ1)t1 = 3ν ⇒ t1 =
3ν
1− µ1
(98)
where ν is chosen such that t1 ∈ N. From every repetition, the user gets 1 symbol from W1.
Hence, L = ν. The user asks for µ1t1 =
3µ1ν
1−µ1
individual coded symbols from the keys, and
the database encrypts the downloads with coded keys constructed from a ( 3ν
1−µ1
, 3µ1ν
1−µ1
) MDS
code. This ensures the security. The achievable rate in this case is
R =
L
t1 + t2
=
ν
3ν
1−µ1
=
1− µ1
3
(99)
For R(µ) = 2(1−µ1)(1−µ2)
3(1−µ2)+(1−µ1)
: To achieve this rate, the user downloads individual symbols
from all messages from database 1, i.e., the user downloads a1, b1, c1 from database 1. The
user combines the two undesired symbols b1, c1 into a 2-sum b1 + c1 and uses it as a side in-
formation in database 2. The query table for one repetition of the scheme for the meaningful
symbols (without showing the keys) is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: The meaningful symbols for M = 3, N = 2 to achieve 2(1−µ1)(1−µ2)
3(1−µ2)+(1−µ1)
.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1 + c1
In this case, the scheme is repeated ν times such that t1, t2 ∈ N,
(1− µ1)t1 = 3ν ⇒ t1 =
3ν
1− µ1
(100)
(1− µ2)t2 = 1ν ⇒ t2 =
ν
1− µ2
(101)
Database 1 encodes µ1t1 =
3νµ1
1−µ1
independent and uniformly distributed keys using a
( 3ν
1−µ1
, 3νµ1
1−µ1
) MDS code to obtain the coded keys that are added to each download. Sim-
ilarly, database 2 encodes µ2t2 =
νµ2
1−µ2
keys using a ( ν
1−µ2
, νµ2
1−µ2
) MDS code to obtain the
coded symbols. Using this scheme, the user decodes L = 2ν from the desired messages.
Consequently,
R =
L
t1 + t2
=
2ν
3ν
1−µ1
+ ν
1−µ2
=
2(1− µ1)(1− µ2)
3(1− µ2) + (1− µ1)
(102)
For R(µ) = 4(1−µ1)(1−µ2)
4(1−µ2)+3(1−µ1)
: An instance for this scheme is the µ1 =
1
4
, µ2 =
1
2
example.
To avoid repetition, we give only the general rate. As shown in the example, t1 =
4ν
1−µ1
, and
t2 =
3ν
1−µ2
. From every repetition, the user can decode 4 symbols, hence L = 4ν. Thus,
R =
L
t1 + t2
=
4ν
4ν
1−µ1
+ 3ν
1−µ2
=
4(1− µ1)(1− µ2)
4(1− µ2) + 3(1− µ1)
(103)
This completes the description of the capacity-achieving scheme for PIR-WTC-II for
M = 3, N = 2, and arbitrary µ. The capacity region C(µ) is shown in Fig. 4. In Fig. 5, we
illustrate the partitioning of the µ space in terms of the active capacity expression; note by
convention µ2 ≥ µ1.
5.2 General Achievable Scheme
In this section, we present the general achievable scheme for PIR-WTC-II that achieves the
retrieval rate in Theorem 2. The core of the achievable scheme is the achievable scheme of
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Figure 4: Capacity for M = 3, N = 2 as a function of µ1 and µ2.
the corner points in the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints in [40]. A new
ingredient is needed to satisfy the security constraint, namely, encrypting the answer strings
by random keys. The nth database uses a random key Kn of length µntn that is sufficient
to span the space of the eavesdropper’s observations. The nth database encodes Kn using
a (tn, µntn) MDS code and uses the resulting codeword to encrypt each downloaded symbol
from the meaningful downloads in addition to µntn individual symbols of coded key symbols
only. For completeness, we include all related details of the scheme in [40] in addition to the
new ingredients.
We use the same terminology as in [40]. Let sn ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1} denote the number
of side information symbols that are used simultaneously in the initial round of downloads
at the nth database. For a given non-decreasing sequence {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M , the
databases are divided into groups, such that group 0 contains database 1 through database
n0, group 1 contains n1 − n0 databases starting from database n0 + 1, and so on.
Hence, let sn = i for all ni−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ ni with n−1 = 0 by convention. Denote
S = {i : sn = i for some n ∈ {1, · · · , N}}. We follow the round and stage definitions in [22].
The kth round is the download queries that admit a sum of k different messages (k-sum
in [12]). A stage of the kth round is a query block of the kth round that exhausts all
(
M
k
)
combinations of the k-sum. Denote yℓ[k] to be the number of stages in round k downloaded
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Figure 5: Partitions of µ space according to the active capacity expression forM = 3, N = 2.
from the nth database, such that nℓ−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ. The details of the achievable scheme
are as follows:
1. Calculation of the number of repetitions: The user and the databases agree on appro-
priate answer string lengths tn(n,µ), n = 1, · · · , N . To that end, the scheme associated
with n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 is repeated ν times such that:
tn(n,µ) =
νDn(n)
1− µn
∈ N, ∀n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (104)
where Dn(n) is the number of meaningful downloads corresponding to one repetition
of the achievable scheme associated with the monotone non-decreasing sequence n =
{ni}
M−1
i=0 .
2. Preparation of the keys: The nth database generates a random key Kn. The random
key Kn is of length µntn, such that elements of Kn are independent and uniformly
distributed over Fq. The nth database encodes Kn to an artificial noise vector u
(n)
[1:tn]
using a (tn, µntn) MDS code, i.e.,
u
(n)
[1:tn]
= MDStn×µntnKn (105)
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3. Initialization at the user side: The user permutes each message independently and
uniformly using a random interleaver, i.e.,
xm(i) =Wm(πm(i)), i ∈ {1, · · · , L} (106)
where xm(i) is the ith symbol of the permuted Wm, πm(·) is a random interleaver for
the mth message that is chosen independently, uniformly, and privately at the user’s
side.
4. Initial download: From the nth database where 1 ≤ n ≤ n0, the user downloads∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
symbols from the desired message. The user sets the round index k = 1.
I.e., the user starts downloading the desired symbols from y0[1] =
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
different
stages.
5. Message symmetry: To satisfy the privacy constraint, for each stage initiated in the
previous step, the user completes the stage by downloading the remaining
(
M−1
k−1
)
k-sum
combinations that do not include the desired symbols, in particular, if k = 1, the user
downloads
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
individual symbols from each undesired message.
6. Database symmetry: We divide the databases into groups. Group ℓ ∈ S corresponds
to databases nℓ−1 + 1 to nℓ. Database symmetry is applied within each group only.
Consequently, the user repeats step 2 over each group of databases, in particular, if
k = 1, the user downloads
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
individual symbols from each message from the
first n0 databases (group 1).
7. Exploitation of side information: The initial exploitation of side information is group-
dependent as well. Specifically, the undesired symbols downloaded within the kth
round (the k-sums that do not include the desired message) are used as side infor-
mation in the (k + 1)th round. This exploitation of side information is performed by
downloading (k+1)-sum consisting of 1 desired symbol and a k-sum of undesired sym-
bols only that were generated in the kth round. However, the main difference from [12]
is that, for the nth database, if sn > k, then this database does not exploit the side in-
formation generated in the kth round. Consequently, the nth database belonging to the
ℓth group exploits the side information generated in the kth round from all databases
except itself if sn ≤ k. Moreover, for sn = k, extra side information can be used in the
nth database. This is due to the fact that the user can form n0
∏
s∈S\{sn}
(
M−2
s−1
)
extra
stages of side information by constructing k-sums of the undesired symbols in round 1
from the databases in group 0.
8. Repeat steps 5, 6, 7 after setting k = k + 1 until k = M .
9. Repetition of the scheme: Repeat steps 4, · · · , 8 for a total of ν repetitions.
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10. Shuffling the order of the queries: By shuffling the order of the queries uniformly,
all possible queries can be made equally likely regardless of the message index. This
guarantees the privacy.
11. Encryption of the downloads: The database encrypts each meaningful download by
adding one symbol from u
(n)
[1:(1−µn)tn]
. Furthermore, the user downloads u
(n)
[(1−µn)tn+1:tn]
coded key symbols individually. This guarantees the security.
5.3 Decodability, Privacy, Security, and Achievable Rate
Decodability: To see the decodability, we note that the user receives µntn individual
artificial noise symbols u
(n)
[(1−µn)tn+1:tn]
from the nth database. From the MDS property of
the (tn, µntn) MDS code, any µntn coded symbols suffice to reconstruct the entire tn coded
symbols. Hence, the user can reconstruct and cancel u
(n)
[1:tn]
by the knowledge of u
(n)
[(1−µn)tn+1:tn]
.
Consequently, after canceling the artificial noise symbols, the user is left with only the
meaningful symbols in the answer strings.
Now, by construction, in the (k + 1)th round at the nth database, the user exploits the
side information generated in the kth round in the remaining active databases by adding
1 symbol of the desired message with k-sum of undesired messages which was downloaded
previously in the kth round. Moreover, for the nth database belonging to the ℓth group at
the (ℓ+1)th round, the user adds every ℓ symbols of the undesired symbols downloaded from
group 0 to make one side information symbol. Since the user downloads
∏
ℓ∈S
(
M−2
ℓ−1
)
from
every database in the first n0 databases (group 0), the user can exploit such side information
to initiate n0
∏
ℓ∈S\{ℓ}
(
M−2
ℓ−1
)
stages in the (ℓ + 1)th round from every database in group ℓ.
Since all side information symbols used in the (k+1)th round is decodable in the kth round
or from round 1, the user cancels out these side information and is left with symbols from
the desired message.
Privacy: The privacy of the scheme follows from the privacy of the inherent PIR scheme
under asymmetric traffic constraints. Specifically, for every stage of the kth round initiated in
the exploitation of the side information step, all
(
M
k
)
combinations of the k-sum are included
at each round. Thus, the structure of the queries is the same for any desired message. The
privacy constraint in (4) is satisfied by the random and independent permutation of each
message and the random shuffling of the order of the queries. This ensures that all queries
are equally likely independent of the desired message index.
Security: From the nth database key Kn is of length µntn. The elements of Kn are
independent and uniformly distributed in Fq. The nth database encodes Kn into the artificial
noise vector u
(n)
[1:tn]
using a (tn, µntn) MDS code. Since any µntn columns of the generator
matrix of the MDS code are full rank, the mapping from Kn to any µntn symbols from the
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artificial noise vector Un = [u
(n)
i1
, · · · , u
(n)
iµntn
] is a bijection, and consequently, Un ∼ Kn, where
∼ denotes statistical equivalence. Moreover, since there is no shared randomness between
databases, the elements of (K1, · · · , KN), and consequently the elements of (U1, · · · , UN) are
independent and uniformly distributed in Fq.
Now, the eavesdropper chooses to observe µntn symbols from the nth answer string
A
[i]
n . Denote the eavesdropper observations by Z
[i]
n ∈ Fµntnq . Since all downloaded symbols
are encrypted using u
(n)
[1:tn]
(counting the downloads that contain solely the artificial noise).
Denote the artificial noise symbols within Z
[i]
n by Un. Hence, the leakage at the eavesdropper
can be upper bounded by:
I(W1:M ;Z
[i]
1:N) = H(Z
[i]
1:N)−H(Z
[i]
1:N |W1:M) (107)
≤
N∑
n=1
µntn −H




U1
U2
...
UN



 (108)
=
N∑
n=1
µntn −
N∑
n=1
µntn = 0 (109)
where (109) follows from the fact that any µntn artificial noise symbols are independent.
Note that the units of calculation is q-ary symbols.
Achievable Rate: For the calculation of the achievable rate, we focus first on one rep-
etition of the scheme. Without adding the artificial noise symbols, the structure of one
repetition of our scheme is exactly as [40]. The recursive structure of the achievable scheme
can be described using the following system of difference equations that relate the number
of stages in the databases belonging to a specific group as shown in [40, Theorem 2]:
y0[k] = (n0−1)y0[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{0}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
y1[k] = (n1−n0−1)y1[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{1}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
yℓ[k] = n0ξℓδ[k−ℓ−1] + (nℓ−nℓ−1−1)yℓ[k − 1] +
∑
j∈S\{ℓ}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1], ℓ ≥ 2 (110)
where yℓ[k] is the number of stages in the kth round in a database belonging to the ℓth
group, i.e., for the nth database, such that nℓ−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ.
Hence, to calculate Dn(n) such that nℓ−1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ, which is the number of meaningful
downloads from the nth database belonging to the ℓth group, corresponding to one repetition
of the achievable scheme associated with the sequence n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 , we note that for any
stage in the kth round, the user downloads
(
M−1
k−1
)
desired symbols from a total of
(
M
k
)
29
downloads. Therefore,
Dn(n) =
M∑
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k], nℓ−1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ (111)
Consequently, the total download
∑N
n=1 tn(n) from all databases from all repetitions is
calculated by observing (104),
N∑
n=1
tn(n,µ) =
N∑
n=1
νDn(n)
1− µn
(112)
= ν
[
n0∑
n=1
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
y0[k]
1− µn
+
n1∑
n=n0+1
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
y1[k]
1− µn
+ · · ·
]
(113)
= ν
∑
ℓ∈S
nℓ∑
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k]
1− µn
(114)
Furthermore, the total desired symbols from all databases from all repetitions is given by,
L(n) = ν
∑
ℓ∈S
M∑
k=1
(
M − 1
k − 1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1) (115)
Thus, the following rate is achievable corresponding to the sequence n,
R(n,µ) =
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
1−µn
(116)
Since this scheme is achievable for every monotone non-decreasing sequence n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 ,
the following rate is achievable,
R(µ) = max
n0≤···≤nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
1−µn
(117)
5.4 Optimality for M = 2 and M = 3 Messages
In this section, we prove the optimality of our scheme for M = 2 and M = 3. The proof
relies on relating the upper bound for the PIR-WTC-II problem with the upper bound for
the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints. From the settled optimality of the
achievable scheme of the meaningful symbols for M = 2, M = 3 for the PIR problem under
asymmetric traffic constraints, we conclude the optimality of our scheme for PIR-WTC-II.1
1Alternatively, for a specified N , µ, we can prove the optimality by showing that the KKT conditions of
the upper bound optimization problem are satisfied by our achievable scheme.
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We return to the upper bound in Theorem 1,
C¯(µ) = max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(118)
= max
τ∈T
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)τn · min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
1 +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1·
∑N
n=1(1−µn)τn
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni·
∑N
n=1(1−µn)τn
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(119)
= max
τ∈T
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)τn · min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
1 + 1
n1
∑N
n=n1+1˜
τn + · · ·+
1
∏M−1
i=1 ni
∑N
n=nM−1+1˜
τn
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(120)
= max
τ∈T
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)τn · C˜(τ˜ ) (121)
where τ˜n is obtained by the change of variable τ˜n =
(1−µn)τn
∑N
i=1(1−µi)τi
and the inner problem C˜(τ˜ )
is defined as:
C˜(τ˜ ) = min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
1 + 1
n1
∑N
n=n1+1˜
τn + · · ·+
1
∏M−1
i=1 ni
∑N
n=nM−1+1˜
τn
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(122)
The inner problem is precisely the upper bound for the PIR problem under asymmetric
traffic constraints τ˜ in [40, Theorem 1].
In the following lemma, we show that the solution of C¯(µ) exists at one of the corner
points of C˜(τ˜ ).
Lemma 4 The solution of C¯(µ) exists at one of the corner points of C˜(τ˜ ) after the change
of variables τn =
∑N
i=1(1−µi)τi
(1−µn)
.
Proof: To show this, we note that the upper bound in Theorem 1 can be written as the
following linear program as discussed in Remark 3:
max
τ ,R
R
s.t. R ≤
∑N
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
, ∀n
N∑
n=1
τn = 1, τn ≥ 0, n = 1, · · · , N (123)
Equivalently, from (120), we can write the optimization problem corresponding to the
upper bound as:
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max
τ∈T,R˜,τ˜
N∑
n=1
(1− µn)τn · R˜
s.t. R˜ ≤
1 + 1
n1
∑N
n=n1+1˜
τn + · · ·+
1
∏M−1
i=1 ni
∑N
n=nM−1+1˜
τn
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
, ∀n
N∑
n=1
τ˜n = 1, τ˜n ≥ 0, n = 1, · · · , N
τ˜n =
(1− µn)τn∑
i(1− µi)τi
, n = 1, · · · , N (124)
We note that the constraints of this equivalent problem is the same as constraints of the
upper bounds of the PIR problem under the asymmetric traffic constraints τ˜ .
Since there are a finite number of constraints (NM−1+2 constraints), the feasible region
is a polyhedron, thus, the solution for C¯(µ) resides at a corner point of this polyhedron.
For any corner point of this optimization problem, (N + 1) constraints are active (i.e.,
met with equality) and linearly independent.
Since these constraints take the form of
R =
∑N
n=1(1− µn)τn +
∑N
n=n1+1
(1−µn)τn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
(1−µn)τn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(125)
by dividing both sides by
∑N
i=1(1− µi)τi > 0, the constraint become
R˜ =
R∑N
i=1(1− µi)τi
=
1 + 1
n1
∑N
n=n1+1˜
τn + · · ·+
1
∏M−1
i=1 ni
∑N
n=nM−1+1˜
τn
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(126)
Hence, the condition of intersection of the active constraints of the C¯(µ) is the same as the
condition of the intersection of the bounds of C˜(τ˜ ) after the change of variables. Thus, it
suffices to consider the corner points of the inner problem and map the solution using the
change of variables τn =
∑N
i=1(1−µi)τi
(1−µn)
. 
Consequently, for a corner point of the inner problem (τ˜ ∗, C˜(τ˜ ∗)), we have the reverse
change of variables
τ ∗n = τ˜
∗
n ·
∑N
i=1(1− µi)τ
∗
i
1− µn
(127)
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Now, since
∑N
n=1 τ
∗
n = 1,
∑N
n=1 τ˜
∗
n ·
∑N
i=1(1−µi)τ
∗
i
1−µn
= 1, which leads to
N∑
i=1
(1− µi)τi =
1∑N
n=1
τ˜n
1−µn
(128)
Denote C¯(τ˜ ∗,µ) to be the upper bound of the PIR-WTC-II problem corresponding to the
corner point (τ˜ ∗, C˜(τ˜ ∗)) of the inner problem, hence from (121), we have
C¯(τ˜ ∗,µ) =
N∑
i=1
(1− µi)τi · C˜(τ˜
∗) (129)
=
C˜(τ˜ ∗)∑N
n=1
τ˜n
1−µn
(130)
Thus, the upper bound can be written in terms of the corner points of the inner problem
{τ˜ (i)}θi=1, where θ is the total number of corner points as
C¯(µ) = max
i∈{1,··· ,θ}
C˜(τ˜ (i))∑N
n=1
τ˜ (i)
1−µn
(131)
5.4.1 M = 2 Messages
From [40], we know that for M = 2, all the corner points of the inner problem are in fact
optimal. For an increasing sequence (n0, n1), the corner points are characterized by:
τ˜n =


n0+1
n0(n1+1)
, 1 ≤ n ≤ n0
1
n1+1
, n0 + 1 ≤ n ≤ n1
0, n1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
⇒ C˜(τ˜ ) =
n1
n1 + 1
(132)
Hence, the upper bound for M = 2 can be explicitly written as:
C¯(µ) = max
n0,n1∈{1,··· ,N}
n1
n1+1∑n0
n=1
n0+1
n0(n1+1)(1−µn)
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
1
(n1+1)(1−µn)
(133)
= max
n0,n1∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1∑n0
n=1
n0+1
1−µn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0
1−µn
(134)
From the achievability side, for a sequence (n0, n1), the system of difference equations in
Theorem 2 reduces to
y0[k] = (n0 − 1)y0[k − 1] (135)
y1[k] = n0y0[k − 1] (136)
for k = 1, 2, where y0[1] = 1, and y1[1] = 0. Hence, y0[2] = n0 − 1, and y1[2] = n0.
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Consequently, the achievable rate in Theorem 2 is explicitly evaluated for M = 2 as:
R(µ) = max
n0,n1∈{1,··· ,N}
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
1−µn
(137)
= max
n0,n1∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1∑n0
n=1
n0+1
1−µn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0
1−µn
(138)
which matches the upper bound and concludes the optimality for M = 2.
5.4.2 M = 3 Messages
Similarly, from [40], the corner points of the inner problem occur for an increasing sequence
(n0, n1, n2). The corner points are characterized by:
τ˜n =


n0n1+n0+1
n0(n2n1+n1+1)
, 1 ≤ n ≤ n0
n1+1
n2n1+n1+1
, n0 + 1 ≤ n ≤ n1
n1
n2n1+n1+1
n1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ n2
0, n2 + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
⇒ C˜(τ˜ ) =
n1n2
n1n2 + n1 + 1
(139)
Hence, the upper bound in (131) is explicitly written as:
C¯(µ) = max
n0,n1,n2∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1n2∑n0
n=1
n0n1+n0+1
1−µn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0n1+n0
1−µn
+
∑n2
n=n1+1
n0n1
1−µn
(140)
From the achievability side, we have the following system of difference equations for
k = 1, 2, 3:
y0[k] = (n0 − 1)y0[k − 1] + (n1 − n0)y1[k − 1] + (n2 − n1)y2[k − 1] (141)
y1[k] = n0y0[k − 1] + (n1 − n0 − 1)y1[k − 1] + (n2 − n1)y2[k − 1] (142)
y2[k] = n0δ[k − 3] + n0y0[k − 1] + (n1 − n0)y1[k − 1] + (n2 − n1 − 1)y2[k − 1] (143)
with the initial conditions y0[1] = 1, y1[1] = 0, and y2[1] = y2[2] = 0. Evaluating yℓ[k], for
ℓ = 0, 1, 2, and k = 1, 2, 3 recursively leads to y0[2] = n0−1, y1[2] = n0, y0[3] = n1n0−2n0+1,
y1[3] = n1n0 − 2n0, and y2[3] = n1n0. Consequently, the achievable rate from Theorem 2 is
explicitly expressed as:
R(µ) = max
n0,n1∈{1,··· ,N}
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
1−µn
(144)
= max
n0,n1,n2∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1n2∑n0
n=1
n0n1+n0+1
1−µn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0n1+n0
1−µn
+
∑n2
n=n1+1
n0n1
1−µn
(145)
which matches the upper bound and concludes the optimality for M = 3.
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Remark 10 We note that the meaningful portion of the answer strings follows the combina-
torial water-filling shown in [40] for M = 2 and M = 3. This means that the less threatened
(more secure) databases are returning more meaningful symbols than the less secure ones,
hence, τ˜n ≥ τ˜k, if n < k. However, the length of the entire answer string including the arti-
ficial noise symbols may not follow the same structure, e.g., in the example in Section 5.1.2,
we see that t1 = 16 and t2 = 18, i.e., τ2 > τ1, while τ˜2 < τ˜1.
5.5 Achievable Rate for N = 2 and Arbitrary M
Following the analysis of this case in [40], let s2 ∈ {0, · · · ,M − 1} be the number of side
information symbols that are used simultaneously in the initial round download in the second
database.
Hence, the user starts with downloading
(
M−2
s2−1
)
stages of individual symbols (i.e., the
user downloads M
(
M−2
s2−1
)
symbols from round 1 from all messages) from the first database to
create 1 stage of side information in the (s2+1)th round. After the initial exploitation of side
information, the two databases exchange side information. More specifically, from database
1 in the (s2 + 2k)th round, where k = 1, · · · ,
⌊
M−s2
2
⌋
, the user exploits the side information
generated in database 2 in the (s2 + 2k− 1)th round to download
(
M−1
s2+2k−1
)
desired symbols
from total download in the (s2 + 2k)th round of
(
M
s2+2k
)
. Similarly from database 2, in the
(s2 + 2k + 1)th round, where k = 0, · · · ,
⌊
M−s2−1
2
⌋
, the user exploits the side information
generated in database 1 in the (s2 + 2k)th round, and downloads
(
M−1
s2+2k
)
desired symbols
from total of
(
M
s2+2k+1
)
downloads in the (s2 + 2k + 1)th round. Thus, using the calculation
in [40], we have
D1(s2) =M
(
M − 2
s2 − 1
)
+
⌊M−s22 ⌋∑
k=1
(
M
s2 + 2k
)
(146)
D2(s2) =
⌊M−s2−12 ⌋∑
k=0
(
M
s2 + 2k + 1
)
(147)
where Dn(s2) corresponds to the length of the meaningful downloads within the nth database
from one repetition of the scheme, therefore, the total download of the scheme is given by:
t1(s2) + t2(s1) =
D1(s2)
1− µ1
+
D2(s2)
1− µ2
(148)
=
1
1− µ1

M(M − 2
s2 − 1
)
+
⌊M−s22 ⌋∑
k=1
(
M
s2 + 2k
)
+
1
1− µ2


⌊M−s2−12 ⌋∑
k=0
(
M
s2 + 2k + 1
) (149)
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The message length does not change due to the security constraint, hence, directly from [40],
we have
L(s2) =
(
M − 2
s2 − 1
)
+
M−s2−1∑
k=0
(
M − 1
s2 + k
)
(150)
Consequently, the achievable rate is explicitly given as:
R(µ) = max
s2∈{0,··· ,M−1}
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑M−s2−1
k=0
(
M−1
s2+k
)
1
1−µ1
[
M
(
M−2
s2−1
)
+
∑⌊M−s22 ⌋
k=1
(
M
s2+2k
)]
+ 1
1−µ2
[∑⌊M−s2−12 ⌋
k=0
(
M
s2+2k+1
)] (151)
including the corner point corresponding to the trivial rate, i.e., when the user deactivates
the retrieval process from the second database, leading to (25).
5.6 Further Examples
In this section, we present further examples to clarify the achievable scheme for additional
tractable values of M , N .
5.6.1 M = 4 Messages, N = 2 Databases
In this example, we show the achievable scheme for M = 4, N = 2, and arbitrary µ.
This example helps us to show that our achievable scheme does not achieve the capacity
for all µ. For M = 4, we have M + 1 = 5 possible achievable schemes, corresponding
to s2 = {0, 1, · · · , 3} and one other achievable scheme corresponding to the trivial scheme
of downloading the contents of database 1. Let ai, bi, ci, di denote the randomly permuted
symbols from W1,W2,W3,W4, respectively. In all achievable schemes, the nth database
generates a key Kn with length µntn and encodes it to generate an artificial noise vector
u
(n)
[1:tn]
using a (tn, µntn) MDS code. The nth database provides µntn individual symbols of
artificial noise. In all cases, the scheme is repeated ν times such that:
tn(n,µ) =
νDn(n)
1− µn
∈ N, ∀n ∈ {1, 2} (152)
Now, we focus on one repetition of the achievable scheme. We further concentrate on the
meaningful queries, i.e., before adding the artificial noise vector.
The trivial scheme corresponding to n = (1, 1, 1, 1): In one repetition of the scheme,
the user downloads a1, b1, c1, d1 from database 1. Hence, D1(n) = 4. Consequently, t1(n,µ) =
4ν
1−µ1
. As the user decodes 1 symbol from W1 in each repetition, L1(n) = ν. Hence,
R(n,µ) = 1−µ1
4
is achievable.
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The scheme corresponding to n = (1, 1, 1, 2): In this case, s2 = 3, i.e., the user exploits
3 side-information symbols simultaneously in database 2, i.e., focusing on one repetition of
the scheme, from database 1, the user downloads a1, b1, c1, d1. The user combines b1+ c1+d1
and uses this side information to get a2 from database 2, i.e., the user downloads a2 + b1 +
c1 + d1. Hence, D1(n) = 4, D2(n) = 1. Consequently, t1(n,µ) =
4ν
1−µ1
, and t2(n,µ) =
ν
1−µ2
.
As the user decodes 2 symbols from W1 in each repetition, L1(n) = 2ν. Hence, R(n,µ) =
2
4
1−µ1
+ 1
1−µ2
is achievable. The query table of the meaningful queries (without the artificial
noise) for one repetition of the scheme is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Meaningful queries for M = 4, N = 2, s2 = 3.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1 a2 + b1 + c1 + d1
The scheme corresponding to n = (1, 1, 2, 2): In this case s2 = 2, hence the user
combines every 2 undesired symbols from database 1 to form one side information symbol.
To that end, the user downloads
(
M−2
s2−1
)
= 2 stages of individual symbols (1-sum) from
database 1, so that the user forms 2-sums that can be used in database 2 as side information
to start round 3 directly. More specifically, the user downloads a3 + b1 + c1, a4 + b2 + d1,
a5 + c2 + d2 from database 2 taking into considerations that all these undesired symbols are
decodable from database 1. The user completes the stage by downloading b3 + c3 + d3 that
can be further exploited in database 1 by downloading a6 + b3 + c3 + d3. Hence, D1(n) = 9,
D2(n) = 4. Consequently, t1(n,µ) =
9ν
1−µ1
and t2(n,µ) =
4ν
1−µ2
. As the user decodes 6
symbols from W1 in each repetition, L(n) = 6ν. Hence, R(n,µ) =
6
9
1−µ1
+ 4
1−µ2
is achievable.
The query table of the meaningful queries (without the artificial noise) for one repetition of
the scheme is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Meaningful queries for M = 4, N = 2, s2 = 2.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1 a3 + b1 + c1
a2, b2, c2, d2 a4 + b2 + d1
a5 + c2 + d2
b3 + c3 + d3
a6 + b3 + c3 + d3
The scheme corresponding to n = (1, 2, 2, 2): In this case s2 = 1, hence the user
exploits the individual undesired symbols downloaded from database 1 directly as a side
information in database 2. To that end, the user exploits the side information generated
in round 1 by downloading a2 + b1, a3 + c1, and a4 + d1. The user completes the stage by
downloading undesired symbols consisting of 2-sums that do not include ai, hence the user
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downloads b2 + c2, b3 + d2, c3 + d3. The undesired symbols are exploited in database 1, thus
the user downloads a5+b2+c2, a6+b3+d2, and a7+c3+d3. The user completes the stage by
downloading b4+c4+d4, which can be exploited in database 2 by downloading a8+b4+c4+d4.
Hence, D1(n) = 8, D2(n) = 7. Consequently, t1(n,µ) =
8ν
1−µ1
, and t2(n,µ) =
7ν
1−µ2
. As the
user decodes 8 symbols from W1 in each repetition, L(n) = 8ν. Hence, R(n,µ) =
8
8
1−µ1
+ 7
1−µ2
is achievable. The query table of the meaningful queries (without the artificial noise) for one
repetition of the scheme is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: The query table for M = 4, N = 2, s2 = 1.
Database 1 Database 2
a1, b1, c1, d1 a2 + b1
a3 + c1
a4 + d1
b2 + c2
b3 + d2
c3 + d3
a5 + b2 + c2 a8 + b4 + c4 + d4
a6 + b3 + d2
a7 + c3 + d3
b4 + c4 + d4
As in the case of M = 3, under the assumption that µ1 ≤ µ2, the symmetric scheme
in [12] does not achieve any larger retrieval rates at any µ. Hence, the following rate is
achievable,
R(µ) = max
{
1− µ1
4
,
2
4
1−µ1
+ 1
1−µ2
,
6
9
1−µ1
+ 4
1−µ2
,
8
8
1−µ1
+ 7
1−µ2
}
(153)
In Fig. 6, we illustrate the partitioning of the µ space in terms of the active achievable
scheme. In Fig. 7, we plot the gap versus µ for M = 4, N = 2. We note that the gap is
upper bounded by 0.0051 and this gap exists only for specific regimes of µ.
5.6.2 M = 2 Messages, N = 3 Databases
In this example, we show the achievable scheme for M = 2, N = 3, and arbitrary µ. Again
we focus on the meaningful queries in our exposition to avoid repetition. The artificial noise
incorporation is exactly as in the previous examples. Let ai, bi denote the randomly permuted
symbols from W1,W2, respectively.
The trivial scheme corresponding to (n0, n1) = (1, 1): In this case, the user deactivates
the retrieval from database 2. Hence, in one repetition, the user downloads a1, b1 from
database 1 only. Therefore, D1(1, 1) = 2 which leads to t1(1, 1,µ) =
2ν
1−µ1
. From one
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Figure 6: Partitions of µ space according to retrieval rate expression for M = 4, N = 2.
repetition of the scheme, the user decodes 1 symbol from W1, hence L = ν symbols. This
gives the rate R(1, 1,µ) = 1−µ1
2
.
The scheme corresponding to (n0, n1) = (1, 2): In this case, the user exploits the
undesired symbols in database 1 as a side information in database 2 only and deactivates
database 3. Hence, in one repetition, the user downloads a1, b1 from database 1, and uses
b1 as side information in database 2 by downloading a2 + b1. Therefore, D1(1, 2) = 2,
D2(1, 2) = 1 which leads to t1(1, 2,µ) =
2ν
1−µ1
, and t2(1, 2,µ) =
ν
1−µ2
. From one repetition of
the scheme, the user decodes 2 symbols from W1, hence L = 2ν symbols. This gives the rate
R(1, 2,µ) = 22
1−µ1
+ 1
1−µ2
. The query table of the meaningful queries (without the artificial
noise) for one repetition of the scheme is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Meaningful queries for M = 2, N = 3, n = (1, 2).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1 a2 + b1
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Figure 7: Capacity gap for the case of M = 4, N = 2.
The scheme corresponding to (n0, n1) = (1, 3): Since n1 = 3, the user exploits the side
information in database 2 and database 3. Hence, in one repetition, the user downloads a1, b1
from database 1. The user downloads a2 + b1 from database 2, and a3 + b1 from database
3. Therefore, D1(1, 3) = 2, D2(1, 3) = 1, D3(1, 3) = 1 which leads to t1(1, 3,µ) =
2ν
1−µ1
,
t2(1, 3,µ) =
ν
1−µ2
, t3(1, 3,µ) =
ν
1−µ3
. From one repetition of the scheme, the user decodes
3 symbols from W1, hence L = 3ν symbols. This corresponds to the rate R(1, 3,µ) =
3
2
1−µ1
+ 1
1−µ2
+ 1
1−µ3
. The query table of the meaningful queries (without the artificial noise) for
one repetition of the scheme is shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Meaningful queries for M = 2, N = 3, n = (1, 3).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1 a2 + b1 a3 + b1
The scheme corresponding to (n0, n1) = (2, 2): In this case, the user applies the sym-
metric scheme at databases 1 and 2, and deactivates database 3. Consequently, the user
downloads a1, b1 from database 1. From database 2, the user downloads new symbols a2, b2.
The user exploits the side information generated in the first round of download by download-
ing a3+b2, and a4+b1. Therefore, D1(2, 2) = 3, D2(2, 2) = 3 which leads to t1(2, 2,µ) =
3ν
1−µ1
,
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t2(2, 2,µ) =
3ν
1−µ2
. From one repetition of the scheme, the user decodes 4 symbols from W1,
hence L = 4ν symbols. This gives the rate R(2, 2,µ) = 43
1−µ1
+ 3
1−µ2
. The query table of the
meaningful queries (without the artificial noise) for one repetition of the scheme is shown in
Table 8.
Table 8: Meaningful queries for M = 2, N = 3, n = (2, 2).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1 a2, b2
a3 + b2 a4 + b1
The scheme corresponding to (n0, n1) = (2, 3): In this case, the user further exploits
the side information generated in databases 1 and 2 in database 3. Hence, the user downloads
a3 + b1, a4 + b2 from database 3. Therefore, D1(2, 3) = 3, D2(2, 3) = 3, D3(2, 3) = 2 which
leads to t1(2, 3,µ) =
3ν
1−µ1
, t2(2, 3,µ) =
3ν
1−µ2
, t3(2, 3,µ) =
2ν
1−µ3
. From one repetition of
the scheme, the user decodes 6 symbols from W1, hence L = 6ν symbols. This gives the
rate R(2, 3,µ) = 63
1−µ1
+ 3
1−µ2
+ 2
1−µ3
. The query table of the meaningful queries (without the
artificial noise) for one repetition of the scheme is shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Meaningful queries for M = 2, N = 3, n = (2, 3).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1 a2, b2 a3 + b1
a4 + b2
a5 + b2 a6 + b1
The scheme corresponding to (n0, n1) = (3, 3): In this case, the user applies the
symmetric scheme in [12]. Therefore, Dn(3, 3) = 4, where n = 1, 2, 3 which leads to
tn(3, 3,µ) =
4ν
1−µn
. From one repetition of the scheme, the user decodes 9 symbols from
W1, hence L = 9ν symbols. This gives the rate R(3, 3,µ) =
9
4
1−µ1
+ 4
1−µ2
+ 4
1−µ3
. The query
table of the meaningful queries (without the artificial noise) for one repetition of the scheme
is shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Meaningful queries for M = 2, N = 3, n = (3, 3).
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
a1, b1 a2, b2 a3, b3
a4 + b2 a6 + b1 a8 + b1
a5 + b3 a7 + b3 a9 + b2
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Consequently, the following rate is achievable:
R(µ) =max
{
1− µ1
2
,
2
2
1−µ1
+ 1
1−µ2
,
3
2
1−µ1
+ 1
1−µ2
+ 1
1−µ3
,
4
3
1−µ1
+ 3
1−µ2
,
6
3
1−µ1
+ 3
1−µ2
+ 2
1−µ3
,
9
4
1−µ1
+ 4
1−µ2
+ 4
1−µ3
}
(154)
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the PIR-WTC-II problem. We have shown that the problem
is a concrete example of the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints. We obtained
a general upper bound that extends the converse techniques in [40]. The converse proof
takes the form of a max-min optimization problem. The inner minimization problem derives
the tightest upper bound for the retrieval rate for an arbitrary traffic ratio vector τ , while
the outer maximization problem optimizes over τ . The core of the achievability proof is
the achievability proof of the corner points of the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic
constraints. The security constraint is satisfied by encrypting each returned answering string
by an artificial noise vector. To generate the artificial noise vector, the nth database generates
a secret key and encodes it into artificial noise by a (tn, µntn) MDS code. The upper and
lower bounds match forM = 2 andM = 3, for any N , and for every eavesdropping capability
vector µ = (µ1, · · · , µN).
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